t is estimated that more than 110 million active mines are a permanent threat in some 70 countries, resulting in about 2000 casualties per month, most of them being civilians. The anti-personnel mines (APM) and anti-tank mines (ATM) found in several affected countries are mostly buried, non metallic or with minimum metal content; the most dangerous types are PROM_l, MRUD, PMR_3, and TMR_P6.
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Using the classical technologies (metal detector, dogs, prod ding) finding, localizing and identifying the landmines is a time consuming, expensive and extremely dangerous proce dure. In addition, it will take a long time to de-mine the affected countries, mainly because the same tedious procedure has to be applied to all areas suspected to be contaminated with landmines. Mined areas are generally close to the battle fields, being consequently heavily infested by metal pieces from the explosions of different ordnances (explosion of an ordnance can result in more than 1000 small metal frag ments). The presence of metal clutter produces a large number of false alarms in the metal detectors (MD) com monly used in de-mining. As a consequence, there is a need for a technological breakthrough in this field to solve defini tively the land-mine problem.
Moreover, the threat of terrorist use of explosive devices and chemical, biological or radioactive agents has become realistic since the SARIN attack in the Tokyo subway system on March 20, 1995 and after the tragic events of September 11, 2001. The possibility of further terrorist actions against civil population is one of the most important issues on the international political agenda. An often evoked scenario implies the use of the so-called "dirty bomb": a sizeable quantity of radioactive material detonated by conventional explosive and dispersed in the environment. The illicit traf ficking of explosives and fissile material through conventional commercial networks (air, maritime and terrestrial) repre sents therefore a real challenge to civil security for future years. Manual and visual inspection of large commercial pay loads at terrestrial borders (trucks), seaports (containers) and airports (check-in luggage) would not be a viable solution both from efficiency considerations and for legal reasons. It is mandatory to realise standoff integrated inspection systems of cargo by means of imaging and analytical methods based on a sound technology to identify threat materials. X-ray or gamma-ray based imaging is the only technique which enables a direct view of objects embedded or buried in soil. State of the art systems can give good precision density measurements with high-resolution three-dimensional images. The observed shapes and mechanical structure of detected objects may help to identify a particular mine type or at least to distinguish a mine from other buried objects such as metal scrap. Metal can be distinguished further by the avail able gross information about the elemental content of the inspected item (low Z vs. high Z discrimination).Two recent examples of systems under investigation are discussed below.
Mine detection with neutrons
The key to distinguishing explosives from benign materials is, as for the detection of buried landmines, the use of the elemental analysis. Only neutron interrogation offers the possibility of measuring the elemental density of most ele ments in materials independent of their particular structure.
The use of neutron-induced reactions for non-destructive bulk elemental analysis is well documented. All neutrons, in particular fast neutrons, are well suited to explore large vol ume samples because of their high penetration in bulk material. Nuclear techniques hinge on the fact that the explosives con tain hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen in variable concentrations (for example, elementary compositions of some common explosives are: TNT -C7H5N3O6; RDX -C3H6N606; pentrite -O12N4C5H8; hexogen -O8N8CH 8; ammonium nitrite -0 3N2H4). The problem of explosive identification can be thus reduced to the problem of identifi cation of light elements. Furthermore, the measurements of concentration ratios, especially carbon to oxygen and carbon to nitrogen, are very effective in discriminating explosives from the medium in which they are buried or hidden. 
Neutron Backscattering
The principle of the technique is very simple: when a fast neutron source (such as 252Cf ) is used to irradiate the soil, the yield of thermalized, backward scattered neutrons depends on the hydro gen content of the irradiated volume. Therefore, to confirm the presence of the mine, a Neutron Backscattering (NB) sensor will verify the presence of anomalous hydrogen concentration in the target point, previously identified by using, for instance, a com mon tool such as the MD. From an operational point of view, it is mandatory to have a unique hand-held system that integrates a NB probe inside a MD.
One possible Neutron Backscattering detector design makes use of a large area (20 x 20 cm 2) Multi-Wire Proportional Counter (MWPC) as a neutron detector. The detector consists basically of 3 parallel electrodes: a plane of wires as anode and the two cathodes coated with a 3 pm thick B4C layer, 97% enriched in 10B. The anode wires are grouped to obtain 10 independent portions having an area of 2 x 20 cm2. In this system, the effi ciency for low energy neutrons is determined by the conversion via the 10B(n+α) reaction which is estimated to be about 16% .The detector electrodes are light (700 g) and have been specifi cally designed to minimize the metal content, so that the performance of a standard MD is not lowered when it is inte grated with the NB sensor. Laboratory tests with the NB sensor working in stand-alone mode, in a configuration where the MWPC electrodes are enclosed in a gas-tight, sealed G-10 box operated at atmospheric pressure with a mixture of Ar (85%) and CO2 (15%) show that a steady gas charge will allow opera tion during an 8 hours shift without showing a significant deterioration of the signal size.
An example of a portable system realized by the group of Prof. Carel W.E.Van Eijk of Delft University (The Netherlands) is shown in fig. 2 . fig. 3 : on the left-hand side is shown the gamma-ray spectrum detected without requiring a strict coincidence between the alpha particle and the associated neu tron hitting the sample. One can see a peak between 5 and 6 MeV due to neutrons hitting direcl y the Nal counter, and the 4.4 MeV and "first escape" peaks assodated to the decay of 12C in the sample. On the right-hand side is shown the same spectrum but with a strict con dition on the alpha-gamma coincidence time.
One can notice a dramatic improvement of the signal-to-noise ratio due to both the "geometrical" and "timing" related reduction of the background contribution. Such improvement can be of up to two orders of magnitude in the case of a pure mono-elemental sample.
Another important property of a system based on fast neutron ele mental analysis is the "granularity" of the tagging system that determines the number of neutron beams that can be produced and their maximum transversal dimension. In other words the position resolution of the alpha particle tagging system determines the "imag ing" properties of the associated neutron beams.
With the use of two small (5x5x5 cm3) graphite samples placed at about 6 cm distance from each other on a plane at 90 cm from the neutron source, the usual gamma-ray line at 4.4 MeV is used to con firm that a neutron has hit one of the two samples. The "image" of such a double-sample system as determined in the associated alphapartide detector is shown in fig. 4 below.
The distribution of hits on the 40 mm diameter YAP:Ce alpha counter is determined in this case by the "centre-of-gravity" method of the signal amplitudes recorded by a multi-anode pho tomultiplier tube. One can see in the figure the capability of one such system to create an "image" of a given element (in this case 12C). Extending the method to different elements or mapping directly the elemental ratio one can envisage obtaining a "chemi cal map" of the area under investigation.
Mine detection with photons
As discussed earlier, neutron activation may cause gamma rays with characteristic energies to be emitted by land mine constituents. The second, rather promising approach to employing photons in the landmine detection process is photon scattering. Compton scat tering is dominant in most materials at photon energies below several hundred keV. In this process, photons collide incoherently with the atomic electrons, thereby loosing part of their energy. The scattering probability is dependent on the electron density, and con sequently the mass density, of the medium. Therefore, Compton scattering can provide a density map, which can be used as an indi cator that an anomaly falls in the range of explosive materials.
The intensity of photons scattered by an object embedded in soil is proportional to i) the intensity of the photons emitted from a source towards the object, ii) the attenuation of the photons before they scatter, iii) the probability of scattering in the back direc tion and iv) the attenuation of the photons as they pass back out of the object and traverse the soil on the way to the photon detector. Sources of photons can be either high power x-ray gener ators capable of producing x-rays ranging in energy up to 300 keV and more, or gamma sources containing radioactive iso topes such as 137Cs or 22Na. The photons emitted in the direction of the soil and the objects therein are partly removed by side-scattering or absorption in the material. Back-scattered photons travelling towards the detector are again partly removed by further scattering or absorption. Organic material and in particular explosives are character ized by a low effective atomic number, resulting in a high scattering probability and low absorption probability. Dense, metallic material on the other hand readily absorbs low energy photons (x-rays), while for higher energy gammarays the remaining Compton scatter probability together with the high density may yield a stronger backscatter signal compared to organics and soil. The combination of density and atomic number can therefore be characteristic for explosives, metal debris or other material.
The photon backscatter techniques aim at mapping the effective atomic number and the density of a given soil area. An image of the backscatter distribution may thus reveal irregularities in the soil enabling one to distinguish metallic clutter from land mines by geometry and scatter probability. Generally a position resolution of 2 mm to 4 mm is sufficient for the identification of APMs, whereas for ATMs 1 cm may still be adequate.
In conventional systems collimation of the employed x-ray or gamma-ray beam and its scanning movement is required to map a suspicious surface area. Appropriate beam geometry is achieved by means of a suitably shaped channel in a dense and heavy absorbing material such as lead or tungsten alloys. Good image resolution generally requires a small beam profile, thus the usable fraction of radiation emitted by the photon source is often very small in the range of 0.001 to 1 percent. Rather high source activity is required to obtain the necessary radiation dose at each scanning position in a short time span. Otherwise the total time to generate an image would be impracticably long.
Devices can for instance be mounted on a remote-con trolled vehicle, with only the detectors suspended over the minefield by a cantilever arm. To produce an undistorted image the speed of the vehicle would need to be either regu lated or accounted for. The backscatter system might be applied as the second stage of a two-stage process in which the first stage identifies suspect objects, and backscatter imaging verifies each threat. For example, a metal detector and a neutron detection system could be used in the first stage.
X-ray imaging
X-ray imaging is a mature technology with the advantage of very high image contrasts and good position resolution. In contrast to transmission technologies such as radiography a backscatter image normally is obtained pixel by pixel. A scanning mechanism for a pencil-like x-ray beam is used to generate images. The attenuation of low energy x-rays in soil and explosives is tremen dous. Depending on the soil composition and density the total probability for an x-ray to penetrate through the soil to a mine, be backscattered by the mine material and to travel through the soil back into the detector may be of the order 10-8 at 10 cm mine depth. Therefore the highest possible x-ray energies and intensi ties are required to achieve good contrast in a reasonable scanning time.
An example is the prototype scanner 
Backscatter imaging with gamma rays
Recently a novel backscatter imaging technique has been intro duced, which uses the source of gamma rays very effectively by avoiding any collimation. Therefore the required source activity can be several orders of magnitude below conventional systems. be registered in the Position gamma detector. The active detection area of this detector defines the beam shape of the correlated 511 keV gamma rays intended to probe the object to be examined. Its spatial resolution determines the image resolution. The Backscatter gamma detector detects gamma rays scattered from the object. The backscatter probability depends on the amount, density and element composition of the object. To distinguish between gamma rays belonging to the probing beam and other gamma rays emitted by the source or by other natural or artificial radia tion sources, time coincidence of the signals of both detectors is demanded.
Currently a detection system is being developed at GSI Darm stadt by its technology transfer partner company GFE mbH, aiming particularly at the detection of land mines in soil. It incorporates a 22Na source of 10 MBq activity in a massive tung sten alloy shielding. The position detector has nine position sensitive LYSO scintillator block elements. The elements form a shell segment covering a solid angle of about 5% of 4tc. Each ele ment is coupled to a position sensitive photomultiplier which, together with the subsequent electronics circuitry, produces x and y position as well as time information for each gamma ray detected.
The Backscatter detector consists of 8 plastic detector elements read out by three photomultiplier tubes each, forming a 5 cm thick disc with ca. 50 cm outer diameter and a rectangular centre hole. The 511 keV gamma rays emitted by the source illuminate the object of inspection through this hole. If a 511 keV gamma ray is detected at a certain position of the Position detector its 180° counterpart may be scattered off an object in front of the set-up. For a given range of scattering angles this scattered gamma ray maybe detected in the Backscatter detector and generates a coin cidence trigger. An image of the matter distribution in the field of view -defined by the active area of the Position detector and the source to matter distance-is obtained by incrementing an image data array in the data acquisition computer. Fig. 7 shows as an example the image of a metal object and of a small candle of 5 cm diameter in sandy soil. The enhanced backscatter probability of the metal allows it to be discriminated from the candle with its reduced probability, which resembles the scattering behaviour of a plastic mine with 511 keV gamma rays. Depending on the soil type and the volume of the mine the layer thickness that can be penetrated is 10 to 40 cm.
The presented imaging device may help to verify mines found e.g. by metal detectors and may considerably speed-up the clearing of mine fields by avoiding time consuming treat ment on harmless metal objects. Moreover, for APM detection in shallow depths a handheld system may be realized since the efficient use of the gamma source with this new method allows for low activity and, hence, lightweight protective shielding.
The novel methods employing neutron and gamma ray probes for mine detection reveal very promising results in the laboratory and in field trials. Therefore we believe that instru ments based on these techniques may soon become available to detect land mines in a much safer way and much faster compared to current approaches.
